Estimating the Degree of Market Power in Iran's Beef Industry Based on Components of Demand

Document Type : applicative

Authors

1 Associate Professor in Economics, Department of Economics, Faculty of Socisl Sciences, Razi University, Kermanshah, Iran.

2 Ph.D. in Economics, Razi University, West Regional Electric Company, Kermanshah, Iran.

3 Ph.D. Student in Economics, Razi University, Province Electric Distribution Company, Kermanshah, Iran.

Abstract

In this paper, while using  the Green and Porter's trigger price oligopoly model as well as data for the period 1996-2020, the impacts of  of negative demand shocks on the market conduct and structure of Iran's beef industry were investigated.  For this purpose, a system of equations consisting of three functions of demand, supply and price-cost margin  was specified  to identify  large and negative demand shocks through demand residuals and grid search approach. The results indicate that the beef market has become more competitive following the unexpected decline in demand, but the structure of the factor (livestock) market has not changed. By using auxiliary tests, the results of this study were reconfirmed. Using the results of this research, policies can be made to improve competition in beef industry.

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References

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Journal of Industrial Economics researches
Volume 6, Issue 22
November 2023
Pages 1-22

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History

  • Receive Date: 23 January 2023
  • Revise Date: 28 February 2023
  • Accept Date: 22 May 2023

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